Abstract-SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony) is unsolicited, unwanted phone calls made for advertising products or voice phishing. The real time nature of voice calls makes traditional email anti-spam techniques un-applicable to SPIT detection in a VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) network. The VoIP users have social network with colleagues, friends, family members, and other acquaintances. Various social reputation approaches have been proposed but these were mainly based on average call duration or require user feedback to assign reputation score. We believe that the computation of reputation should be two fold; firstly it should not involve user feedback and secondly it considers other network features in addition to call duration. In this paper, we propose a social strength for detecting SPIT callers. We analyze how similarities and social ties among VoIP users effect SPIT detection. The local social strength among users are computed considering more features like out-degree, number of repetitive calls, reciprocity and interaction rate. The global strength of the caller is computed using the Eigen trust algorithm and represents the strength of a caller as whole in a network. The global strength values are then compared with the automated threshold value for finally classifying a caller as legitimate and non-legitimate. A distinct feature of our approach is that it does not involve users for feedback and can be easily deployed in real VoIP network without any change in architecture and SIP protocol stack. We evaluate our social strength approach on different types of random network data and shows that the system detects SPIT callers with false positive rate less then 10% and true positive rate of 99% for all type of underlying random networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
VoIP is a packet switched network and is vulnerable to different security threats that include: social threats, traffic attacks, denial of service attacks, and service abuse attacks from malicious users [1] . For SPIT callers, VoIP is a cost effective way to re-utilize the email Spam generation architecture and send a massive number of Spam voice messages. The SPIT caller generates SPIT calls for advertising their products, getting callee credit card information, making callee to dial special expensive numbers, and generally Voice phishing (Vishing).
The existing solutions for countering e-mail SPAM are not applicable for countering SPIT. In VoIP, the call requires realtime response from a callee and thus the system has to decide the nature of a caller in real-time as well. The other issue that distinguishes SPIT from email SPAM is the unavailability of the conversation contents before the system has to identify the caller as SPITTER or not.
In VoIP and email networks, users have a set of friends, colleagues, and family members with whom they frequently interact. This forms a social network that represents the behavior of a user in the context of other users. Social networks have been used to detect Spam in email [2] , [3] and in social networking sites [4] . In VoIP, call-specific features play an important role while creating a social network of VoIP users. Examples include call duration, the number of calls and missed calls, the time of day of the call, and the number of failed calls.
Various SPIT detection approaches have been proposed. These can be grouped into intrusive and non-intrusive based on whether they involve caller or a callee for decision. The intrusive techniques can either require feedback from a caller or involve a callee for providing feedback about the caller. The non-intrusive techniques do not require user feedback. The reputation base approaches were provided in [5] , [6] [7] , [8] , [9] but they have following two constraints: either they require feedback from the callee to make local decision or they use call duration as a feature to compute local and global reputation. We believe that SPIT detection system can be non-intrusive and use a richer feature set based on the social network of the VoIP users and include the number of calls, interaction rate, call duration, average in-degree and out-degree, strength and communication reciprocity of a caller.
In this paper, we provide a SPIT detection approach based on a social strength of a caller in a network. The features we include for computing local strength are in-degree, outdegree, in-call duration, out-call duration, in-interaction rate, out-interaction rate among caller and a callee. The local trust represents the caller-callee direct trust and global trust is computed using the Eigen trust algorithm. The SPIT caller is detected on the basis of its global trust value and automatic threshold computed from the data. We evaluate our approach on four different synthetic networks and conclude that the social strength approach behaves well under all network distributions. The approach detects SPIT caller with true positive rate of about 99% and false positive rate of 10%. The major contributions of our work are:
• A centralized non-intrusive SPIT detection approach that does not require any explicit or implicit feedback from the caller or a callee and also does not bypass the privacy of users.
• We recommend new attributes set for computing local trust values and a change in initialization vector in the Eigen trust algorithm for computing global reputation. We compare our results with call-rank [9] by generating net- works with different degree distributions and automated threshold value. This paper is organized as follows. Section II contains overview of SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT). Section III contains the literature review and motivation for this work. Section IV presents problem to be addressed in this paper. Section V details the social strength approach for mitigating SPIT and its advantages over other closely related approaches. Section VI provides the details of data-set on which social strength is evaluated and result analysis for different performance metrics. In Section VII, conclusions are drawn and future work is identified.
II. SPIT (SPAM OVER INTERNET TELEPHONY)
Similar to e-mail and other Internet applications, voice over IP systems are vulnerable to abuse by malicious parties for unsolicited and unwanted communications. Telephone system abusers are likely to target VoIP systems increasingly as VoIP replaces traditional telephony. VoIP Spam refers to unwanted, automatically dialed, pre-recorded phone calls using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) [10] , [11] . SPIT is similar to email Spam but is delivered by means of voice calls to a VoIP and PSTN users. The consequence of SPIT are more then the email Spams as it requires real-time response from the callee and have more effect on productivity of human as well as drain network resources. Besides Voice Spams the VoIP network can also be used for sending other type of Spams includes: instant message and presence Spams [5] .
III. ANTI SPIT APPROACHES
A number of approaches have been proposed to stop the SPIT callers from making calls. These approaches can be categorized into pre-acceptance and post-acceptance methods [6] , depending on whether they detect and block SPIT caller before or after a call is accepted. Anti-SPIT techniques are based on one or more of the following: Content-Based Approaches: SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) and RTP (Real Time Protocol) are a widely used for call setup and exchange of voice among users. The content based approaches analyze either semantics of SIP signaling or RTP contents in real and non real-time [6] , [12] , [13] . The content based approaches requires advance signal processing and updated voice data-set for analyzing contents of speech and also bypass user privacy. These techniques are vulnerable to, when the SPIT callers intelligently changes text to voice script with added noise or random text. The call setup messages of SPIT and non-SPIT callers are same which makes SIP message filtering approach un-suitable for SPIT detection. Access List-Based Approaches: Access list-based approaches compare the identity of the caller and a callee with local and global black, white lists. A blacklist specifies who is to be kept out allowing all others to pass; a whitelist only allows those who are already on the list to get through. Both of these techniques require continuous update of white and black listed users. A gray list contains addresses of callers that should be blocked on its first attempt and later allowed if a second attempt is made within a specific time window thus increases number of attempts to reach callee.
Feedback-Based Approaches:
The SPIT callers can be a human or machine. The callers are authenticated via their private-public key exchange or Turing test authentication process [14] , [15] . The complex puzzles has additional burden on callers which annoy them and also increases call setup time. The Payments at Risk based approaches verifies the nature of caller by first deducting money and then giving back if caller found to be legitimate [5] . This solution requires either callee feedback or analysis of speech content among users. Extended Call-Setup Based Approaches: Call-Setup [16] based approach works in the following way: it accept the call from the caller, disconnect it and call back to the caller. The limitation with this technique is that it requires extra hardware or software resources and increases call setup time. Social Network-Based Approaches: Social reputation based approaches [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [17] , [18] use social relationship among caller and a callee. In a VoIP setting, the caller local reputation can be computed from call duration [9] , the number of short and long duration calls [5] , social network properties such as node degree, local clustering coefficient, in-count,out-count, reciprocity measure etc. The callee can also be asked for providing feedback about interacted callers nature [19] , [7] , [20] . The local trust provides direct caller-callee trust on each other and global reputation provides caller reputation as a whole in a network. The global reputation is useful as callee typically does not receive calls from all callers and rely on the feedback from their friends or other users.
In [9] , a local trust is computed from average call duration and a global trust is computed using Eigen trust algorithm. The higher the caller duration, greater the trust a callee has on a caller. In [20] , semi-supervised clustering is used along with reputation feedback from the callee to distinguish a SPIT and a non-SPIT caller. A multi-stage SPIT [19] filter use Bayesian network along with feedback from a callee for the caller reputation. The reputation base techniques can also be applied in combination with other SPIT detection approaches [5] , [21] . These approaches are multistage and interact with each other for final decision about the caller. In [17] , authors used call duration for trust computation and apply length of graph to infer trust for unknown caller. In [18] , authors proposed three solutions for identifying SPIT caller in a large VoIP operator and compared their performance with each other.
Recently [22] combined available multiple SPIT detection solution in a single system and provided its performance against different call rates. The [21] also provided multistage SPIT detection for transit VoIP operators and its response rate against different call rates. The [23] provides SPIT prevention system at SIP provider level. The system enables SIP providers to provide reputation feedback about their users by assigning tags to the outgoing calls according to their SPIT likelihood ratio.
The existing reputation base approaches either involve user feedback or call duration credentials for local trust computation among users. The users are not happy in providing feedback for every call they receive. Higher call duration is the sign of strong relationship [9] but local trust computation cannot be limited to call duration only. The SPIT caller tries to reach huge number of users and managed to have good call duration with number of users which increases its local and global reputation. The SPIT callers either have less or no repetitive and incoming calls as compared to normal users. The out-degree, number of repetitive calls, reciprocal and incoming calls can also be consider for computing local trust among a caller and the callee.
Our proposed approach is based on two things: firstly new feature for computing local trust among the caller and a callee and secondly assigning low initial global trust to a suspected SPIT caller. The local trust is computed using out-degree, number of repetitive calls, reciprocal calls, incoming calls to caller, and total call duration. The higher out-degree nodes can be a suspected SPIT caller and thus assigned low global initial trust. The global trust is computed through Eigen Trust algorithm with initial global trust equals 1/outdegree S . We are not asking users for feedback instead we use automatic updated threshold for final classification of caller. Our proposed work is different from other reputation based techniques in the following way: The approach uses number of social network features for computation of local trust among a caller and the callee, uses Eigen trust with different initialization vector by considering higher degree nodes as suspected SPIT caller and uses automatic threshold for final decision. The proposed approach also does not require any change in SIP protocol stack or change in VoIP network architecture.
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Given a set of n VoIP users A= {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 .....u n }, a caller S is a VoIP user that makes at least one call to other VoIP user and a callee R is a VoIP user that receives at least one call from the caller S. The logs of their communication are available in the form of CDR (Call Detailed Records) stored on a centralized servers basically used for billing purpose. The social network of a VoIP users is shown in figure 1 , where vertices represents the caller or a callee IDs, edges represents the social connection and weights on edges represents the social strength among users. The caller-callee interaction can be strong or weak based on the number of interaction, length of talk-time among them. The high call duration and interaction rate, the stronger the relationship and vice versa. The goal is to extract caller-callee social network from CDR, compute callercallee local trust, caller's global trust and classifying him as a SPIT or non-SPIT caller on basis of his global score.
V. SOCIAL STRENGTH FOR DETECTING SPIT
We present a comprehensive SPIT detection approach that combines different social network features for local and global trust computation. The social network features of caller-callee interactions are extracted from CDRs. The proposed approach detects SPIT caller at the edge of network without any direct or indirect interaction with a caller or a callee. We use call duration of a caller, its out-degree, number of reciprocal calls, number repetitive and incoming calls for local trust computation (section V-A). The global trust is computed using Eigen trust algorithm and automated threshold is computed using 25th percentile of global trust values in a specific time window (section V-B and V-C). We have followed three steps approach: The first step involves, extracting the social behavior of callers from CDR, the second step involves local and global trust computation and third step is threshold computation. The measures in first step include the following:
Call Duration: The total duration of calls for each network user in seconds.
Number of Interaction: The total number of calls made or received by each user. In graphs, this is the weighted degree where the edge weights represent number of calls a user has made to the other users.
Out-Degree: The total number of unique callee associated with each caller in a network. The edge is drawn between users if the caller made call to the certain users.
A. Strength of Caller
The strength of a caller-callee interaction represents how much they involve in bidirectional communications and can be derived from their past interactions. The local strength value of a user provides information about how trusted a caller is to this callee. The legitimate callers calls few callees with number of repetitive and reciprocal calls with good call duration thus have strong strength with higher number of callees and weak strength with few callees. On the other hand the SPIT callers tries to reach huge number of callees and thus have weak strength with large number of callees and strong strength with less number of callees. In a VoIP social network, the edges between the vertices can be labeled with two factors, the number of calls made in both direction and their call duration. The strength should consider both these factors. The local strength or local trust among caller and callee is computed using equation 1.
Where CD is the call duration from S to R and R to S, and IN is the interaction rate from S to R and R to S. The SPIT caller has low call duration and interaction rate but higher outdegree thus gets weak local strength value due to its higher out-degree and less incoming calls.
B. Eigen Trust Algorithm for Social Strength
The global strength of a caller can be computed using Eigen trust reputation algorithm [9] with modification in local trust computation and initial global trust vector. EigenTrust algorithm was originally designed for computing the reputation of peers in a peer to peer network to minimize the number of un-authentic files downloaded in a P2P network [24] . The algorithm provides each user a unique global trust value based on his previous history of communication with other users in a network. In our approach, the Eigen-Trust would be applied to the local strength of caller for global trust computation. We simply wish to compute T i = (C i )* e, where C i is the caller-callee adjacency matrix of local strength values e is vector of initial global trust assign to user S and n is the number of users. In our case we have initialized e as 1/out − degree S . This 1/out − degree S value of user more lower the initial global trust of the caller having higher outdegree. The social strength algorithm is presented in algorithm 1.
In an algorithm 1, C is the local strength adjacency matrix, e is the initial global trust, N is the normalization constant, T S is the global trust value, E New , E old are the Eigen values and T V is the tolerance value .
C. Automatic Threshold
The global trust value of caller can be compared with either 1) fixed threshold or 2) send values of a caller to a callee for decision as a part of SIP invite message [9] or 3) compared with the dynamic threshold value computed from the global trust values. The 1 and 2 requires the feedback from the callee as well as changes in SIP invite message. To overcome the problem of getting feedback from the callee or change in invite message, we uses percentile based automatic threshold value to be compared with the global trust value. Our approach of local and global trust computation results in a low global reputation values to SPIT callers having higher out-degree distribution. We believe that the SPIT caller lies at the bottom if sorted in a decreasing order. We computed 25th percentile of a global trust values in a specific time window. The mean of 25th percentile value is then set as threshold and compared with the global trust value for final classification of a caller as legitimate or non-legitimate. The caller can be classified as legitimate 1 or non-legitimate -1 based on following rule: 
D. Beating Proposed Model
Beating Strength based approach, the SPIT caller requires two conditions to fulfill, first the caller has to call other users with good call duration and interaction rate and secondly the SPIT caller has to contact few callees. In addition to these, the SPIT callers also need to be called by the others so that its local trust value can be improved. The down side of our approach is that there will be some situation where the system blocks such legitimate callers who have low call duration with high out degree as in-case of call centers or banks. This downside can be improved by providing higher initial global trust to such users.
E. The Introduction and Isolated Node Problem
When a new legitimate user joins a VoIP system, the other users in a network does not know his joining of network and thus does not have any social network. The new legitimate user has to call other user to increase his trust level for further communication. In a social strength, we are allowing new user to make minimum of two calls to different users and then 
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our approach on the random data set. We describe the data-set in section VI-A, and present the experimental results in section VI-B and VI-C.
A. Random Data-Set
Due the privacy concerns of users the real call detailed records are not available from operators. Due to this reason, we evaluate our social strength approach by generating random graphs considering proper behavior of a SPIT and non-SPIT callers. In a real network the out-degree and call duration distribution of user follows power law with (2 < alpha < 3) . The proper evaluation is to evaluate the approach against all possible out-degree and call duration distribution. We have considered three main features of caller and callee for generating user data-set. These features are: interaction rate, out degree distribution and average call duration. We consider power law, exponential, uniform random and normal random distribution for modeling the out-degree distribution of the caller. The edges among users are drawn in a uniform random way. The average number of interactions is assigned using poison distribution. Mostly in voice communication the average call duration of caller fits the exponential distribution that's why we use exponential distribution for mapping user call duration over set of interacted callee's.
For the evaluation and detection of a SPIT caller in a network, we also generated SPIT user by considering the social behavior of SPIT caller in a VoIP network. We created different percentages of SPIT callers to the normal users.
B. Result Analysis
In this section, we present the results of our social strength approach using synthetic data-set and compare them to the call-rank for different performance metrics.
In the call-rank the callee is the focal point for providing its call credentials. We implemented the call-rank with automatic threshold without any Turing test and callee interaction. The call-rank has true positive rate of 60% for uniform degree distribution but does not provide good results for other distributions as shown in figure 2 .B. The false positive rate of call-rank is under control which is positive sign of not blocking legitimate caller but is increasing with SPIT rate. The call-rank suffers from low true positive rate figure 2.B as compared to social strength approach thus allowing non-legitimate caller for calling. The accuracy of the call-rank is 75% for uniform degree distribution figure 2.C and below 50% for the other distributions that shows the call-rank works fine under uniform degree distribution.
The proposed social strength approach shows same behavior for all under lying degree distribution. The true positive rate for a social strength approach is around 99% and false positive rate is less then 10% figure 3.A and B. The false positive and true positive rate decreases with the increase in percentage of SPIT callers. The probability of SPIT callers to be considered as legitimate caller increases with the increase in percentage of SPITTER callers from 1% to 30%. The increased in SPIT callers results in allowing few SPIT callers to make calls, thus having low true positive rate under high number of SPIT callers figure 3 .B. The accuracy of the social strength is above 95% but decreases to 70% with the increase in number of SPIT callers figure 3.C. When a network has higher number of SPIT callers, some of the SPIT callers behave similarly to legitimate caller which is the main reason for low accuracy and true positive rate at higher SPIT rate. The true negative rate decreases with the increase in the number of SPITTER rates which is the positive sign of not losing revenue. The false positive and true positive values can be further improved by adding one further stage in the detection process considering the trust value of a caller and its degree distribution.
C. Minimum Out-degree for Social Network
The new caller requires strong social network after few calls for making further calls. If all the users have less out-degree distribution then the system would classify the caller wrongly. The higher the degree distribution of a caller in a network the more feedbacks are considers for reputation computation. The system accuracy increases with the increase in an out-degree figure 4 . We evaluate social strength approach with power law distribution for out-degree distribution of 1 to 10 and SPIT caller rate of 20%. The results show that the system becomes stable after only 3 user-interactions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Generating unwanted calls over a VoIP network is easy and cheap as compared to circuit switched network. If left uncontrolled SPIT will be more than annoying and will have an enormous economic impact as it will drain the productivity of users and network. The existing social network base approaches have some architectural flaws and consider only few social features for reputation computation.
In this paper, we provided SPIT mitigating approach using social network of caller. The local and global strength of caller is computed using comprehensive set of social network features. The result of social strength for different degree distributions shows that the approach gives the accuracy of 99 % when percentage of spammers is less than 30% for all underlying degree distributions. This would be increased in 30-40% increase as compared to call rank when used with fixed threshold. We believe that the operators can be benefited in detecting SPIT callers without any complex processing and change in VoIP network architecture or change in SIP protocol stack.
The Future works include: analyze the social strength for real call detailed records, combining other social network features with social strength and machine learning approach for threshold computation. 
